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.coward the Assessment of the Susceptibility of a Digital
System to Lightning Upset
We report on accomplishments and directions for further
research aimed at developing methods ti; assess a candidate design
of an avionic computer, especially a fault-tolerant compute:, with
respect to susceptibility to lightning upset. This report is pre-
sented in three main sections. Section I is a review of our con-
sideration of topics essential to an understanding of lightning
upset.	 Section II is a first cut at integrating the knowledge
gained in Sec. I into an approach to comparing one design against
another.
	
Section III addresses an approach to lightning-induced
transient fault effects in digital systems from the fault-tolerant
aspects of the problem.
	
Section IV is a list of tasks which
req.lire further work.
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I. Aspects of Assessing Lightning Upset
There are many aspects to assessing the lightning upset
potential of an airborne digital system. The overall items which
will be addressed are:
A. Characterizing the electromagnetic environment of
the digital system, and
B. Consideration of system properties and system effects.
A. Electromagnetic Environment
Any upset-potential assessment techniques must take into
account the electromagnetic environment in which the system is to
be operated. The upset potential of any particular system against
transients generated by lightning will depend on whetner single or
multiple faults are generated within one or several units. While
it is relatively simple to design a fault-tolerant system which
will deal with single faults in a single unit, it becomes much
more difficult to design a system which deals with multiple faults
in several units simultaneously.
	
The upset potential of a more
complex system will also be mere difficult to assess. It i!.
therefore beneficial to examine the electromagnetic environment
and to make it as benign as is practical.
Research efforts to describe the electrical transients
created by lightning in an aircraft environment have been carried
out for several years (Reference A). The lightning stroke, either
nearby or direct, interacts with the airframe and produces the
stress of the computer system inside. 	 Analysis and measurement
a
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can determine the threshold of the system for upset (or damage, or
any other criterion). In order for the system to function accord-
ing to the criterion selected we must insure that the stress at
the system level is below the threshold of the system. However,
it may not be practical to fulfill this condition for the entire
n t 
system, in particular if the system is a distributed one; or it
may not be practical to design the system for a worst-case light-
ning strike.
1. Lightning Stress
When lightning strikes or occurs near an aircraft, intense
electromagnetic (EM) fields exist outside the aircraft which
create large currents and voltages on the aircraft exterior.
Since the aircraft exterior is not a perfect shield, these large
currents and voltages on the aircraft exterior create large EM
fields inside the aircraft. The internal EM fields induce current
and voltage transients on the internal wires. The lightning
induced current and voltage transients are conducted by the wires
to the inputs of integrated circuits (ICs). The ICs connected to
wires on which lightning-induced transients exist can be upset.
An important aspect of the problem is that the lightning-induced
transients exist simultaneously on many wires connected to many
ICs.	 The effects caused upon ICs by the simultaneous occurrence
of a large number of lightning-induced transients needs to be
investigated.
	 The investigation should consider both individual
ICs of various complexity and small subsystems of ICs such as a
single printed circuit board.
	 The investigation should include a
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study phase in which related EMP and other EMC investigations are
reviewed carefully. Then appropriate analytical methods, experi-
ments, and computer simulations should be proposed to determine
the new lightning-induced upset information believed needed. How
the new lightning-induced upset information for individual ICs or
small collection of ICs is to be used to assess overall system
upset effects should be considered throughout the effort.
2. Shielding
In order to obtain a useable electromagnetic environment for
each unit of a system, i.e., to avoid unmanageable stress, the
design of the system should incorporate the concepts of system
r topology. These concepts were originally developed in connection
with hardening of ground-based facilities against nuclear EMP, and
also in connection with electromagnetic interference control
(Reference B,C).
	
The topological model leads to the design of a
cost-effective system whose reliability can be predicted with con-
fidence.	 The basic ideas of the topological zoning concept will
be summarized in the next paragraph,	 details can be found in the
two references cited.
In the topological view, a system is decomposed into differ-
ent "zone" or "volumes". Each zone is separated from thMa neigh-
boring zone by a barrier which is substantially impervious to
electromagnetic waves or conducted currents. Although the ideal
barrier is a perfectly conducting closed shield, this ideal need
nct be achieved in practice, because any metal shield of struc-
tural thickness offers sufficient attenuation against diffusion of
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electromagnetic fields. 	 The most serious violation of the
requirement that the shield be closed are penetrations by insu-
lated conductors.	 These penetrations are of course necessary but
they must be treated at the barrier with devices like filters,
surge arrestors, limiters, etc. These devices attempt to close
the shield, and they can effectively achieve this outside the fre-
quency band used for data transmission or above a maximum valtage
level.	 The system design should begin with an identification of
the boundaries of the various zones. If the boundaries coincide
with metal shields, then the configuration control consists simply
of identifying the penetrations and treating them to the extent
possible.
	
(Apertures are usually much less important, but they
should also be examined, see Reference B and C.) If the system
and the barriers are designed such that each barrier attenuates
external noise to a level below internal noise* generated by the
subsystem itself, then an additional advantage is gained: the
system continually tests itself against failure because any out-
side transient will be reduced to a transient no larger than the
ones generated by the system itself. It may not be practical to
require that much attenuation of a particular barrier; a tradeoff
between isolation requirements and upset potential must be per-
formed.	 Note that a ground conductor should never penetrate a
shield because it compromises the integrity of that boundary.
How are the zones identified in an aircraft?	 To he cost
effective it	 is essential to	 take advantage	 of existing
*Internal noise here does not mean the steady-state background but
rather the maximum transient generated by the system.
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boundaries. For example, in an aircraft with a metal fuselage the
first natural boundary is the fuselage itself. 	 The skin of the
aircraft will dramatically reduce the amplitude of the external
lightning transient. The next boundary may be an equipment rack,
or an equipment box, and so on. Thus each successive zone becomes
I
	
	
electromagnetically quieter than the one outside of it.	 In an
aircraft with a fuselage made of advanced composit- meterial the
first barrier may be the equipment rack. 	 Cable trays or conduit
connecting different racks could ensure the integrity of this
first level of shielding.	 In some cases, especially when two
F	
units are separated by a large distance, fiber optics coulu `)e
used to save weight.
it may turn out that a system cannot he de!;i,jned economical ly
such that every procesor is located in a quiet zo!u , , eshec is 1 1 y in
an advanced composite aircraft.	 In such a (-ase,	 hi<lh duality
:;hip Idiny could be applied around a compact 	 "inner	 !;.rnctum".
Except for power lines (properly treated with fil t-ors and sur(Ie
arr(-stors)
	 there would be no electrical penetr,rtinn of 'ire inner-
most barrier.
	 A11 data lines would consi-,t_ )f fih(r	 Such
a design would have the advantage that the pro,)t^i functioning of a
p rocessor in the inner sanctum could be relied on with vary high
conf idence. This unit would be unaffected by l i , lhtni.ny or other
transients and could therefore be used to do the nece-,:3ary check-
ing of peripheral units to determine their proper functioning.
IA. S stem F ffects of U set
As discussed above, computer systems, and mor- :;hecif ical.ly
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fault-tolerant computer systems in aircraft, 	 can be subject to
harsh electromagnetic environments. There is a need to assess
system designs, both hardware and software, for susceptibility to
upset.
1. Stress Characterization
At a system level the currently foreseen stress of upset is
the disruption of vulnerable registers and memory, and the disrup-
tion of clocks. A well designed system will eventually restore
the disrupted registers and memories, and will restore the proper
phase relations among its clocks.	 Obviously the system cannot
begin to recover until the stress ends. From knowledge of the
electromagnetic environment as attenuated through shielding (which
is a part of the system design) one must characterize the maximum
disruption that a design is intended to withstand. As a rough
cut, this can be characterized by two parameters TV and TR defined
as follows:
1. TV is maximum duration of electromagnetic burst above the
the noise immunity threshold of the system.
TR is the minimum time between electromagnetic bursts.
Because lightning often comes not in single bursts, but in
multiple bursts, a more complete characterization is needed. This
is a subject of further research.
By faucet-tolerant designs we mean designs that involve spa-
tial redundancy--usually with cross-checking and provision for
reconfiguration in order to avoid system malfunction in the face
of component failures.
	
In effect, "fault-tolerant" means "intel-
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ligently redundant".	 Redundancy is a powerful approach to compo-
nent failures that are sparse (as opposed to numerous over time),
hard (as opposed to marginal), and enduring.	 Upset results in
error conditions that are not sparse,	 but rather can be dense,
many or even all copies of a component can be effected at once.
The hope for overcoming upset is that the environmental
effect which causes it is short-lived.
2. System Characterization
Two aspects of system response to the effects of upset need
to be considered. 	 Ore is the response due to design features net
including features present on behalf of fault-tolerance. 	 The
other aspect is system response.
It is convenient to think of a redundant design as acting
like a non-redundant equivalent machine with extraordinarily reli-
able components. In this way one partitions the analysis of the
response of a fault-tolerant (i.e., redundant) system into two
parts:
1) Determine the response of the "equivalent" non-redundant
"system" to lightning upset.
2) Set aside the equivalent system and consider the actual
fault-tolerant design, and determine the coupling between
design fractures present on behalf of fault-tolerance and
the other features in this joint response to the stress
of upset.
Part 1)	 is much easier and system designs which are not
satisfactory with respect to that can be ruled out without the
PAGE 11
necessity of undertaking part 2).
Concept of Flush-time
Some process control systems or subsystems can be designed to
have what is called a flush time. 	 The basic model is that of the
controller for a washing machine. For a flush time to exist the
subsystem must refresh all writable memory from input data, or
calculations breed on input data within a fired time - the flush
time. A subsya tem with a flush time will recover its proper oper-
ation within the flush time after upset stress has terminated.
Correlated Failures in Redundant Systems
By fault-tolerant designs we mean designs that involve spa-
tial redundancy -- usually with cross-checKing and provision for
reconfiguration in order to avoid system malfunction in the face
of component failures. 	 In effect, "fault-tolerant" means "intel-
ligently redundant".	 Redundancy is a powerful approach to compo-
nent failures that are sparse (as opposed to numerous over time),
hard (as opposed to marginal), and enduring. 	 Upset results in
error conditions that are not sparse, but rather can be dense,
many or even all copies of a component cai^ be effected at once.
The hope for overcoming upset is that the environmental effect
which causes it is short-lived.
Fault tolerant computer systems have for the most part been
designed under a basic assumption ttar. their environment is random
and that failures occur in a random uncorrelated fashion. This
assumption may not be valid in the case of lightning induced upset
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of an avionics system. First, it is not clear how the electromag-
netic field will develop internal to the aircraft and it is not
clear what effect the physical arrangement of a distributed avion-
ics system will have. So until real time experience and data is
obtained it is bent to assume that there may be positive correla-
tions between failures. There seems to be a need for basic theor-
etical and experimental research in this area. At the most ele-
mentary level the problem is simply how to construct an adequate
voting system among some small number computers whose correlation
matrix is known.	 This problew is itself not totally trivial even
when all of the ccrrelations are zero.
In a distributed system failures may occur simultaneously in
physically separated components due to, for example, leads that
are in close physical proximity to paths of lightning induced cur-
rents.	 It is simply not clear at this time what form the appro-
priate counter measures should take.	 Basic experimental data for
metal and composite bodied aircraft in lightning str_ke is needed.
It will not be possible 'Co completely decouple the avionics
system. However, part of the design strategy should be to make
various subsystems as independent as possible. On the other hand,
effective monitoring should require that the systems be linked as
closely as possible_
	
Thus basic tradeoffs must be made between
minimizing correlations and effective redundancy.
Basic research is needed for the design of fault tolerant
computers in the presence of correlated failures. A promising
approach would be to aenptivly identify the correlation matrix and
to adjust the probability that an individual machine is faulty as
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failures occur.	 Other approaches should be given careful atten-
tion.
3. Upset Detection
Given (i) generic models of lightning-caused pulses which
must be dealt with in the sense that these pulses can potentially
penetrate the established barriers and (ii) an understanding of
the degree to which isolated/well-protected barriers can be
established (i.e.,	 quiet zones) together with their associated
	
costs, research efforts should be be directed at the following two 	 #
issues. First, efforts should be aimed at developing new types of
(what we will refer to in the following as) upset detection
mechanisms/schemes that are fundamentally different from those now
used for single,
	
permanent failure-mode detection. 	 The term
3
"upset detection mechanism/scheme" is used here to broadly des-
cribe any software or hardware or firmware approach (or combina-
tion of these) to the testing/monitoring of operational aspects of
s
a digital system. 	 The specific details or properties of an upset 	 f
detection mechanism/scheme are,
	
of course,
	
that upon which
research will focus.
Regardless of the particular realization of an upset detec-
tion mechanism/scheme, they will, however, all be highly special-
ized or sensitized to the types of upsets that can result in a
digital system as determined by (i) and (ii) above. Of fundamen-
tal significance will be the requirement that any useful, realis-
tic upset detection mechanism/scheme must itself be highly pro-
tected from upsets. 	 This means that such upset detection
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mec.: hanism/schemes must be located in highly shielded zones.
Because of the expense of such zones, these upset detection
mechanisms/schemes should then also be "small" relative to the
overall system.
	
(Otherwise, why not protect the whole system in
such a quiet zone?)	 It is reasonable to suggest that the "small-
ness" of a detection mechanism/scheme is closely related to the
number of failures and subtleness of the failures for which it is
responsible.
	
This then leads to the second issue at which
research should be directed.	 Again given (i) and (ii) above, the
requirements on the initial system design (hardware and software)
that would "force" or "restrict" the upsets to take on more cont-
rolled and observable forms should be investigated. In other
words, can the system be designed such that by fully exploiting
(i) and (ii) above, the class of upsets that must be handled is
limited to a finite overt set? This is another way of saying that
if you cannot avoid the upsets, then learn to live with them by
designing the system such that upsets take the form of deviant,
but nevertheless clearly observable 	 system:; operation.	 By
exploiting this forced observability,
	
the upsets can potentially
be studied experimentally.	 These studies will lead to models of
upsets based upon the more salient features of the experimentally
observed phenomena.
	
Such experimentation will require the devel-
opment of innovative fault injection strategics, and this in turn
will require the availability of state-of-the-art laboratory
instrumentation. The expense of establishing a number of such
laboratory facilities would be well worth the possible outcomes.
In particular,	 the possibility of emulating upsets, to evaluate
3
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detection mechanisms/schemes can only be addressed after injection
experimentation on a variety of prototype systems has taken place.
It should be pointed out that the consideration of upsets
being suggested here is in contrast to reduncancy voting designs
wherein the details of a single upset do not matter, as the
effects of an upset on data output are simply voted away. In the
approach being proposed here, the details of the upsets are of the
essence, for it is these details /features that allow us to con-
sider highly specialized, but small and well-isolated upset detec-
tion mechanisms and schemes.
One final research area related to the above two issues is
the possibility of developing "warning sensors" that trigger the
upset detection mechanisms/schemes relative to the current state
of operation of the system. A "warning sensor" would be a circuit
that was simply meant to flag a "high probability of upset condi-
tion". The isolated/well-protected upset detection mechan-
ism/scheme could then take specialized actions dependent upon the
current system state. The upset detection mechanisms/schemes
would then be cor' ;oned by system state in the r;ensc that in a
certain state of operation, an upset detection mechanism/scheme
when alerted of a highly probable upset condition by a warning
sensor could turn its attention to, say, feature A, of that which
it is monitoring whereas if the system were in a different state
when the warning was received, the upset detection mechan-
ism/scheme might turn its attention to, say, feature B. This sug-
gets that the upset detection mechanism/scheme is somewhat intel-
ligent background monitor.
i
i
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i Differentiation of External Environment from Computer Failure
The phenomena of lightning-induced upset presents special
problems in the detection of system failure and determining if a
real failure has occurred or is only perceived. Lightning induced
upset occurs most probably in areas of high atmospheric turbulence
which greatly stresses the airframe components. There may be
large excursions of dynamic pressures and significant altitude and
velocity changes may be expected.	 If the detection of a computer
malfunction is left to the pilot two things can occur. 	 First, he
may not notice because of an already heavy work load. 	 But worse
he may misinterpret information he is receiving. He might inter-
pret the results of an actual computer failure as being due to the
external environment and not take appropriate corrective measures.
Or he might interpret the influence of the external invironment as
being caused by a computer failure. It is precisely at this time
that the computer controlled avionics system is most important.
If he attempts to reconfigure or to take manual control, catas-
trop:,ic failure could result (especially in a control configured
aircraft such as . those built of advanced composite materials).
The pilot is used here only for analogy, for any master detection
scheme will have precisely these same problems.
The problem is basically the classical problem in communica-
tions of a signal in a noisy environment. In this case the signal
we want to detect contains the information that a failure has
occured. If the noise to signal ratio is high the detection pro-
cess may be very difficult if not impossible.
.r
1
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A successful design then should incorporate some of the
following feature$.	 One, the detection of a computer failure
should be made as obvious as possible. 	 This clearly involves a
i	 tradeoff in design between making a failure have no effect and
k
	
	
making it readily detectable.	 Two, there should be dynamic cross
checking between different sections of the airframe to determine
F the true dynamic parameters of aircraft. Unfortunately this
creates a need for significant'amounts of additional computational
capability and leads to an' increased probability of computer fai-
lure. Design tradeoffs will be necessary.
The other possibility mentioned was that there could be
actual mechanical failures induced by the turbulance. Any state
of the art avionics system should contain a failure detection and
diagnostics subroutine. Great care should be taken in the design
to allow for the differentiation of frame failures and computer
failures.
4. Lists of positive and negative features
Several aspects of a system design can be examined by methods
that include checking for the existence of known essential. fea-
tures, and using various modeling techniques to indicate something
about expected consequences of any troublesome features that are
found. The only methods applicable to designs are methods of ana-
lyzing as opposed to test. Analytic methods are based on a list
of necessary or at least positive features and a list of negative
features.	 The most positive statement about a design that can
i
result from any method of design analysis is that the design exhi-
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bits all the listed necessary features and none of the listed
troublesome features. 	 This does not mean that a system built to
the design will behave well when upset. In other words, methods
can be developed that can exclude known dumb featues and can
demand known necessary features. Potentially, design analysis can
act to screen out obviously weak systems, and to suggest gross
f
areas for their correction. 	 The objectives of the work reported
and proposed have to develop this potential.
Analysis is based on lists of features that are known or
imagined as possibilities - features of the design and features of
the environment. Experience produces surprises which modify these
features. Thus analysis can help to avoid the avoidable but can-
not substitute for experience.
Somewhat Obvious Design Practices Which Improve the Lightning
Upset-Tolerance of a Computing System
The design of a completely upset-tolerant computing system is
an insurmountable problem. However, it is possible to design a
system in such a way as to include a certain degree of upset-to-
lerance. By examining the various problems caused by upset and
considering some of the most obvious design remedies, it is possi-
ble to improve the upset-tolerance of certain computer system
designs by a large degree.
The first and probably most obvious means of providing a
degree of upset-tolerance is to store all programs in read-only
memory (ROM). The information stored therein is non-volatile and
thus not susceptible to change when under the influence of an
CMINAL PW IS	 PAGE 19
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Avoiding the use of multiple byte or multiple word instruc-
tions in the design of a computer system is another means of
improving upset-tolerance. Realizing that an upset phenomenon can
cause a random change in program counter contents, it can be seen
that the use of multiple-segment instructions allows for the pos-
sibility of reading an incorrect or invalid instruction from
memory. This occurs because an :ipset may not leave the program
counter pointing to a location which is not an intended instruc-
tion boundary. After this type of occurrence it is very difficult
to re-synchronize the program execution.
Definition and/or implementation of all possible instruction
codes is another means of improving upset-tolerance. This point
is particularly important to instruction code designs which are
necessarily multiple-byte or multiple-word.
	 By defining all pos-
sible codes an appropriate action can be taken when non-useful
(otherwise invalid) instruction codes are fetched. (Fetching of
invalid instructions is highly likely to occur when the program
counter is upset and left pointing to an instruction boundary.
In the design of the computer systems control unit sequencer,
it is important that all possible state transitions be defined.
In many cases control sequencer designs are minimized by taking
advantage of the fact that certain inputs are never expected or
that certain states are never expected to be reached. This allows
the designer to use the don't care concept in filling out a next
state table. It becomes fairly obvious when considering lightning
upset that the control sequencer inputs and states may become
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unpredictable in the presedNbrqvup this it is
necessary to be specific about all next state transitions in the
control sequencer in-order that the system not get "hung up" in an
undefined control loop.
These are but a few of the obvious "good" design principles
which should be included in an upset tolerant system. These prin-
ciples are similar to those which might be included in the design
of a system which is to be fault-tolerant in the face of component
failure.	 However,	 there is considerable difference between
f
3
upset-tolerance and fault-tolerance and this difference must be
thoroughly considered in order that an appropriate set of "obvi-
ous" design principles for upset-tolerant digital systems may be
F
specified.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALfTY
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY	 PAGE 21
II. First Cut of a Theory of Comparing One Design with Another
for Susceptibility. to Lightning Upset
A. method is needed to compare the relative strengths and
weaknesses of two candidate designs for fault-tolerant avionic
computers,	 with respect to their susceptibility to lightning
up3et. This involves comparative analysis of the two designs.
This means that one analyzes how systems built according to dif-
ferent designs would behave when subjected to some test or tests.
As a preliminary to discussing methods of analysis and simulation,
we address the issue of comparative tests.
	 In Sec. A we pretend
that the designs have beem implemented, and that computer hardware
built according to those designs is available for testing. The
issue is the design of tests to compare a computer built to one
design against a computer built to another design, both operating
in the presence of lightning.
	 In Sec. B we turn to the issue of
determining, in so far as one can, what the results of such a test
`
	
	 would be, without actually running the test or having the hard-
ware.
A. Tests of Comparative Susceptibility
It is instructive to think about the requirements for such a
comparator. The first is that the comparator connectors and the
computer connectors have to be compatible, and that the format of
the signal transmissions also be compatible. 	 A reasonable
approach is to specify a mock aircraft in which the computer is to
operate.	 In particular, one specifies an I/O scheme which both
designs must adhere to.	 Thus a computer of any acceptible design
f
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will be supposed to write into standard output registers.
A second requirement is that the lightning stress imposed on
the computers has to be fair, in the sense that at least on the
average the computers have to be equally stressed. Further
research is required to clarify what 'equally stressed' means when
applied to computers of different design.
Thirdly, there must be a means of comparing upset. 	 This is
different from comparing two computers;	 to compare upset, one
needs a two-level scheme of comparison.	 The first level is to
compare a computer of one design. 	 which is subject to upset,
against a computer of the same design, which is not upset. 	 This
comparison is necessary to measure upset at all. Then the upset
for one design must be compared with the upset for the other
design. Hence the comparator scheme must be elaborated: two com-
puters of design 1, two computers of design 2, and three compara-
tors must be used, r,s shown in Fig. 1. Two computers of design 1,
one subject to upset and the other protected from upset, are con-
nected to a first comparator. 	 The third (i.e., output) port of
this comparator reports on the upset experienced by the computer
of design 1.	 A similar set up is used to produce a report on the
third port of the second comparator; this report is of the upset
experienced by the computer of design 2. The outputs of both com-
parators are connected to the inputs of a third comparator, and
the third port of the third comparator reports on the relative
upset of one design vs. the other design.
A fourth requirment is for measures of upset, to be used by a
comparator that compares an upset computer with a compute. of the
ACT =simulated control voltages to actuators;
S = simulated sensor reports;
IN = input registers of computer;
OUT = output registers of computer;
ESIM = simulation of mock aircraft, including
communications network and flight.
Test set-up for comparing computers	 susceptibility to upset.
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sr.me design which is not upset. As a starting point, one can
think of the output registers as acting on and through a communi-
cations network to direct actuators. We assume that both designs
function through identically designeO networks; these networks are
part of the mock aircraft. It is then possible to analyze the
effect of irregularities in output on the performance of the air-
craft. In other words, the measure of upset will be some function
of the computer output. 	 More precisely, it will be a function of
the outputs of the computer which is upset and the compute: of the
same design which is not upset. 	 A simple comparison, integrated
over time, would give some information. A better measure would
allow for the conversion of digital signals to analog signals,
would consider the response time of the actuators, would account
for possible influence cf some registers on the routing of signals
from ether registers, and would weigh the comparision for the cri-
tically of the control function affected.
There are two modes of comparison, an open-loop mode and a
closed-loop mode.	 In the open-loop mode the input registers
(which convey data to the computer) 	 convey the same data to each
nomputer, independent of what the computer puts in the output
registers. The closed loop mode of comparison includes a way
(e.g. simulation) to allow for the feedback through the environ-
ment i.e. if the computer generates a dive of the aircraft, input
registers will bring back sensor responses to that dive.
	
In this
mode two computers which operate differently in response to upset
will receive different input signals.	 Both modes of comparison
are of interest.
A
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The comparison of the outputs of two computers can be wildly
misleading if the two are not exactly synchronized. Because
fault-tolerant computers involve independent clocks on each redun-
dant module, and are required to be diverted for fault handling,
and because some random uptset phenomena will trigger fault-han-
dling action, the upset computer will not be in synchrony with the
computer which is not upset.	 For this reason the comparator
i	
should not be attached to the computer outputs, but should be
i attached to the control voltages of the actuators„ It is unlikely
that in a test one would have actually implemented the mock air-
craft, but a simulation is required, so that the control voltages
on actuators that respond to the computers under test are availa-
ble. The closed-loop test scheme is diagrammed in Fig. 1; for
open-loop testing the input registers of both computers of a given
design are driven by the non-upset environmental simulation.
B. Analvsis and Simulation of Comparative Susceptibility
we now consider what can be learned from a detailed descrip-
tion of the computer designs, without having the computers on
hand. In a nut shell, one needs to be able to analyze the affect
of upsetting the input registers, and possibly the clocks, on the
output zegisters. If normal practice is followed in the design of
the hardware and the operat:Ayl: system, 	 such analysis will not be
possible. On the other hand, it will not be needed, because nor-
mal practice results in such bad performance under upset that tt.e
design can be ruled out merely for being "normal". Thus a primary
design requirement whould be that the design can be analyzed for
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its response to any sequence of inputs and any nLA se condition on
its clock lines. Section I.B.4 addresses a few of the features
that facilitate such analysis= further research is needed to exa-
mine the issue of analyzeability in more detail.
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III. An Approach to Lightning-Induced Transient Fault
Effects in Digital Systems
A digital system accepts inputs, and acting on these inputs,
in conjunction with previous inputs, produces an output. Figure 2
shows such a system considered separate from its environment.
However, to consider lightning-induced transient faults, a digital
system is better envisioned as one element of the overall operat-
ing environment. In normal operation, the operating environment
generates a class of input signals to the digital sytem. The out-
puts of the system, through actuators, alter the environment, and
can thereby affect the inputs to the control system. 	 This feed-
bacK is shown in Figure 3. 	 This conventional model is based on
the fault-free assumption.
The presence of lightning-in-iuced transient faults can alter
the functional effect of the digital system, and perturb the envi-
ronment so that inputs are no longer the same as in the fault-free
case. Shown in Figure 4, the effect of faults on the system is as
if an additonal set of inputs to the system were present, defining
the transfer function between the conventional system inputs and
outputs. The fault-free condition would be but one case of this
abstract, fault transformable control system, corresponding to one
set of inputs present at the function transform input. This
enlarged system (the expanded equivalent digital system), which
models all possible functions of the original system presented
with faults, need only be considered in the fault-free case; by
application of function transform inputs, it operates fault-free
in the same way as the original system subjected to any specified
iI	 ^
W
WZ	 '
O
J
Q
I ^
w LI J
0
z
LL OU
W
c ^;
_ U)
a_
l_
^ t11
^ v
Cr
a ='
LL I
F--
zw
z0
. zM w
W
u_ n
w
E--
Q
Un
to
i
CU
rr
0
c^
6
Hz
W
z
0
cr
z
w
D
a
O
F--
C)
W W
J C)
LL
Q z
^Q
X
Lli W
W
F--
^n U.1
J
Lr)
0
S_
Z (I
O o
L)
Z
:)L
Z
QdIr Z
—
ll I ~
(Z z
-^ W
CU JQ
11_ >
D
L1J
C)
w
f-
CL
z
Q
Q`
l LJ
(I0
Itl
E --
! 1J
Q"
J
O
Q
H
z
u
In
)I -
u)
ti
11.1
a
F-
ln
4
F—	 (Y
0
Li I F-- F—
J ^1 Q
Q D 1r
> Q W
D LL Z
Of WW 0
N f
D O
n I;
z a
m
a
a[
LL,
n
2
0 o F-
^^I_ zo
t) Z =)
Lij w J
49 EL LAJ
L Z O LLJ >t—
z ^-
W
J
cc
1
I
O
X cri Lr
I
Lli
tLL1 W
1
1
1
1
1 ^-
cr
W Z
It J W
W
- -- --
Q W
Z 4 J
O- -- -	 --
u
(-D
z
Q'
L11
n
C)
.i
O
cr
Z
O
u
z
W
s
Q^
Lij
4
D
a
t-
D
O
,.n Z
LLJ O
C, a
rr
0,n
L l
Er
LL
Z
Q
II
ul
HQ
Li- w
1
1
1
1
	
1	
F—
	
I	 z
1
	
1	 G
	
1	 z
J v
W
>	 CC
ui
J
I 
z1
	
W	 11J
N
	
CL	
LL.1
^ J1
I 117 
Lf)
LIJ1O{-
Li-
1 o1
	
1	 Lij
	
-I	 Q
V/
w
C!)
. ,
1
t?p:(r PAGE
UALITYOF
 
POOR Q	 PAGE 32
faults. An equivalent fault generator produces digital out-
puts for t', a expanded digital system which correspond with the
actual faults occuring in the hostile environment. Figure 5 shows
this equivalent fault generator broken into two parts: 	 the fault
sources, and the system transformation converter. The converter
accepts lightning generated analog fault inputs at various points
in the circuitry, and produces the digital function transformaton
outputs needed for the expanded digital system to behave as the
original did in the presence of faults.
This abstract model contains portions which must be deter-
mined by an intensive research program. Given complete implemen-
tation information for the original system, the expanded digital
system can be determined through a thorough fault analysis of the
original digital system. For complex digital equipment, this will
be a very difficult task; merely functional, or even logical, spe-
cificatons are not sufficient for fault analysis, and chip level
information can seldom be obtained for modern integrated circuits.
Nevertheless, there is a reasonable possibility that this can be
practically done.
	
However, the real issue here is the system
transformation converter.
	 It is the junction between a vast body
of knowledge concerning detailed fault sources, and a large, but
theoretically well understood, fault-free digital system. Very
little is known about this interface -- therefore, a research pro-
gram should be supported which will take this model from only a
basis for abstract understanding to a directly implementable
approach.	 Issues regarding faults, errors, and upsets that are
pertinent to such work will be disscussed in the following.
:..
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A fault is a logical difference at the site of a circuit
failure between faulty and fault-free devices physical failure,
and is expected to make transitions between active and inactive
states during the lifetime-of the equipment. A lightning-induced
transient fault is not due to a circuit failure, but an environ-
mental condition which the equipment was not designed to tolerate.
Information at this fault source level is not digital, but analog
in nature. For example, the actual fault source can be an inter-
nal logical signal modification such that it satisfies neither the
logic high or low digital requirements. In such a case, it is not
possible, in general, to predict how a digital circuit will react.
Moreover, while the digital circuit is a clocked, synchronous
digital system,	 the actual lightning-induced faults caused are
seldom "well-behaved" in the sense that the fault is only synchro-
nously active or inactive with system clock. The well-behaved
assumption greatly simplifies predictions of the fault's opera-
tional implications, but clearly does not reflect -eal situations.
In Figure 5, the fault sources provide analog inputs to the
system transformation converter. The output of the converer is
the first point where the fault sources produce a digital output
which is clearly different from the fault-free condition, and
threfore this is the fault level. Theoretically, knowledge of the
signals at the fault level is sufficient to predict the behavior
of the system in the presence of faults; determining the faults
then amounts to identifying the system transformation converter.
Physical characteristics of the digital system contribute to the
makeup of the converter, so "fault models" wh7:h utilize fault
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source information exclusively, ignoring the system being sub-
jected to those fault sources, are not sufficient to identify the
converter,	 and therefore not sufficient to model the overall
fault/system interaction.
An incorrect logic value at a fault site propagates to other
parts of the circuit. These logic differences between faulty and
fault-free systems are called errors, with the implication that an
error at a failure site is called a fault.	 Errors can be consid-
ered on all lines of a circuit; in Figure 5, they appear at the
digital system outputs, and on all differing lines internal to the
digital system itself.
It has been seen that the fault level is not useful as a des-
cription of fault/system interaction in complex digital circuits,
because observation is not possible at this level. 	 The error
level is one step removed from the fault level. 	 A lightning-in-
duced transient fault can cause a state change in the digital sys-
tem.	 A continuous string of errors can result if the faulty cir-
cuit is not forced.into the correct state, that of the fault-free
circuit.	 Simple loss of synchronization will yield endless
errors, after the I/T fault has disappeared.
In modern digital systems, consisting of LSI integrated cir-
cuits, all circuit lines are not accessible; only pins of the
packages are obseervable. In the attempt to find the lowest
observable level from which to view faults, a complete description
of errors is r ,.,t usable, since most of these observation points
are not available.	 A subset of circuit lines are available, but,
even accepting error propagation latency, the conv ntional defini-
r	 	 rt-
i'
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tion of error suffers from the loss of synchronization problem.ii
f To make errors a useful point of observation, a new definition is
made such that logic signal differences at the observation points
between faulty and fault-free systems will only be interpreted as
errors when the digital system is actually being driven by a
fault. If a set of logic signal differences are observed over one
clock cycle,.then;-an error will be noted over the next clock cycle
only if there 'are logic 'signal differences at the observation
points between the faulty'circuit and a fault-free circuit which
has been forced
.
,-into the exact same state as that of the faulty
circuit at the .- end of the previous clock cycle. With this
interpretation of an error, an error of burst length b occurs if
there are logic.signal differences at the observation points over
b clock cycles.	 Hence, when an error of burst length b is
observed, the circuit has been driven by the actual fault source
for b consecutive clock cycles, less the latency time. It can be
argued that this definition of burst length errors is the lowest
observation level which is of any value in modern digital systems.
However, as will now be discussed, the upset level is a more use-
ful perspective for the goals of the research program being pro-
posed.
A digital system ii dezigned to perform some function. The
primary concern is how faults affect the performance of the design
function. The presence of faults perturbs the system, or "upsets'
it.	 The viewpoint; which observes fault effect at this higher,
functional level, will be referred to as the upset level.
	 The
transfer function described by the system outputs, shown in Figure
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t
	
	 5, in relation to-the signal inputs, is the observation point for
the upset level.
At the upset level, a system is viewed as responding to the
arrival and departure of a transient fault in two states -- the
same as standard system theory separates a general system's res-
ponse to any input.
	 The transient fault is an input to the
expanded equivalent system of Figure 4 and 5.	 This system's res-
ponse to the transient fault input will be the same as any other
system's response-to an input: there will be components both of
the transient response and the steady state response. The differ-
ence here is that with standard system theory, the steady response
is due to a driving input, which remains, and the transient res-
ponse is due to the system's response to the input change. In the
case of the expanded equivalent system with regard to its response
to transient fault inputs, the transient fault arrives and then
disappears. In the purest sense, then, the system' response would
be composed entirely of the transient response, with no steady
state response.
	 However, for this digital system driven with
transient fault inputs, state changes can cause lasting effects on
the system after the departure of the transient fault.
	 These
effects must be classified as steady state effects at the upset
level.	 Fault effects present during, and shortly after, the time
when the system is being driven by the transient fault will appro-
priately be called transient effects. (The word "transient" here
is used differently from that ir. the term "transient fault."
There can be both "transient" and "steady state" responses to a
single "transient fault." The single word "transient" is retained
n 1
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in this discussion for each of These separate meanings because
both are in agreement with standard usages.
It is possible to observe transient and steady state effects
of transient faults because of the functional interpretation of
the upset level. Typically, transient responses are incorrect
data values, loss of time or synchronization, or skipping a compu-
tation step. For example, consider a digital system behaving par-
tially as a moving average filter; the outputs depend primarily on
current and recently applied inputs. Effects of an input disap-
pear with time. For this type of digital system, transient output
perturbations due to transient fault will also vanish over a per-
iod of time.	 This will be true only if the system function
remains unchanged by the fault.
Steady state responses are functional transformations. After
the departure of the transient fault, the system is no longer per-
forming the same transfer function between its signal inputs and
outputs as prior to the transient fault arrival. For the moving
average filter example, a steady state response to a transient
fault modifies the ,filter algorithm. Since the filter may no lon-
ger be a moving average type at all, there can be no expectation
that output perturbations will disappear with time; in fact, with
a function change, the fault effects will not disappear.
A more sophisticated digital system could monitor internal
states and external events to determine if transient faults have
caused a transient effect or, data processing, and initiate recov-
ery procedures when detected. 	 Transient system responses can be
tolerated in this fashion.	 Steady state system responses to a
rPAGE 38
transient fault would transfer execution from the algorithm being
performed, after which there would be no resonable hope for system
recovery. Because of the relatively drastic consequences of a
single transient fault that the steady state fault response can
show at the upsest level, as compared with the transient response,
probably the steady state effects of transient faults should first
i
be considered in this research program.
To concentrate on the steady state fault response of a digi-
tal system,	 the system's functional I/O relationships must be
•	 characterized. The operation of the system can be completely des-
i	 cribed in terms of a finite set of mutually exclusive functional
i
states, covering all possible transfer functions of the system in
Figure 2.	 This set of functional states will be referred to as
the containment set. All possible system states must cause func-
tional operation of one of the elements of the containment set.
This set must include all possible valid functional states of the
fault-free system (that of Figure ?), but, this set must also
include invalid functional states, not explicitly designed into
the system but into which the - ,, stem, can nevertheless be driven
by a transient fault. Arrival at these states, of course, can
only be through those additonal functional states created by
nonzero fault inputs to the expanded equivalent system of Figure
5. (An imporperly designed systen may also arrive at these states
due to unexpected inputs.)
As was previously discussed, an understanding of system res-
ponses to particular fault source requires a detailed knowledge of
the system transformation converter of Figure 5, and this appears
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to be a highly worthy research goal that should be supported.
However, when dealing exclusively with transi.-nt faults, and when
ignoring transient effects of these faults on the system, the
steady state effects can be described in terms of the containment
set; and this set is completely defined by the structure of the
expanded equivalent system. Moreover, since the steady state
fault response is of primary concern (after the departure of the
transient fault) the fault outputs of the system transformation
converter will all be zero; and the expanded equivalent system is
reduced to the original system. This means that the containment
set is completely described by the original digital system itself;
no fault information or system expansion is needed to obtain the
conta±.nment set.
	
This advantageous condition is a result of not
considering solid (permanent) faults, and then ignoring the tran-
sient effects of the remaining faults. 	 NeverthEless, this con-
tainment set is the basis for the analysis of lasting effects of
transient faults,
	
and the likelihood of practically determining
containment sets can be seen to be promising.	 It is not at all
clear that a finite containment set exists for all digital sys-
tems; and this is another important research area. 	 It must be
determined what type of sys::em modifications are necessary to pro-
duce a useful, finite containment set, 	 and whether or not these
modifications are overly restrictive.
Hence, we have proposed a new approach to lightning-induced
transient faults in digital systems. This approach has many major
questions connected with it. It could be the basis of a number of
important research investigations.
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IV. Tasks for Future Work
A. Establishment of electromagnetic zone definitions for
airborne computer systems. Initial determination of how these
zones can be implemented in r.trborne systems.
B. Formulate methods which can be used to determine the EM
thresholds which when exceeded will cause detectable changes
in digital electronic components.
C. Determine the amount of multiplicity present in lightning
upset by considering the electronic effects on all circuits
within a certain electromagnetic zone. Develop parameters to
characterize this.
D. Establish the system levels at which fault masking
can/cannot be tolerated while still allowing the overall sys-
tem to recognize are upset event.
E. Establish a list of "obvious" digital architecture design
practices which can be followed to make a system more upset-
tolerant.
	
Notice of the tradeoffs of using these practices
	
vs.	 other (possibly more classical design techniques e.g.
straightforward state minimization) will be given.
F. Formulate a method whereby one can characterize the
capacity to failures and environmental pheonomenc-^ present
during a lightning event.
C. Development of a fault injection strategy based on exper-
imental data whereby faults can be injected into either real
devices or into emulation/simulation of real devices.
H. Refine and extend theory for comparing candidate designs.
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